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is accepted by a majority of the Court, it may substitute useful problemsolving analysis for result-oriented fiat in the approach to a traditionally bothersome concept.
The familiar mechanism of the two-tier formula-often criticized
for its lack of a clear constitutional bas iS-may thus grow less recognizable in the near future, if it has not already. Equal protection analysis
should assume an increasingly amorphous form if it does undergo the
predicted modification. Whether it can quickly assume the trappings
of coherent constitutional doctrine, however, may prove more important than what the ultimate substance of the new doctrine will be.
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-Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).

An automobile owned by Clara Kluger collided with another
vehicle owned by Bernadette White; White was subsequently
charged with failure to yield the right-of-way. Damage to the Kluger
car was estimated at $250.1 On the date of the accident, Kluger's car
was insured by Manchester Insurance and Indemnity Company, but
her policy did not provide for either "full" or "basic" property damage protection as described in Florida statutes section 627.738.2 Kluger
34. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 177, 179 (1972) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
1. The cost of repairing the automobile was estimated at $774.95. Since the fair
market value of the 1964 Buick was only $250, however, it became necessary to apply
the general rule of law that if the cost of repair exceeds the value of an automobile,
the value of the automobile will be the measure of damages. See 15 BLAsHFIELD, ArroMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 480.1 (1969); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 82 (1966). Had the
former figure been accepted, Kluger could have sued in tort for the damage she sustained.
2. FLA. STAT. § 627.738 (1971) provides essentially that the owner of a motor
vehicle is not required to maintain security with respect to property damage to his
motor vehicle. However, every insurer providing security under the Florida No-Fault
Automobile Insurance Law must offer the owner either full or basic coverage for
accidental property damage to the insured motor vehicle. Full coverage is defined as
insurance without regard to fault, whereas basic coverage is limited to insurance
against damage caused by the fault of another resulting from contact between the
insured vehicle and a motor vehicle as defined in FLA. STAT. § 627.732 (1971). Moreover,
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alleged that she had not purchased the optional property damage
protection because her insurance agent had not explained the possible
consequences of failure to obtain this coverage.
Since Kluger was not entitled to no-fault property damage benefits under her own policy, she attempted to recover damages from
the insurer of the vehicle owned by White. White's insurer rejected
these attempts, however, contending that the $550 threshold set forth
in Florida statutes section 627.738 had not been exceeded and that3
its insured enjoyed tort immunity regardless of her alleged negligence.
Shortly thereafter Kluger filed a complaint for declaratory relief in
the Dade County Circuit Court,' asking that her insurance company
(Manchester) be required to provide some "unstated equitable relief"
and that she be permitted to bring an action against White.5 Upon
motions by Manchester and White, the circuit court dismissed the
complaint with prejudice. In part, the order recited that Florida

§§ 627.738(4)-(5) (1971) provide that an owner is exempted from tort
liability for damages not in excess of $550. That is, if the property damages sustained
by an owner to his automobile are less than $550, he must look to his insurer for relief
or sustain the loss himself; whereas, if the damages are in excess of $550, the damaged
party may maintain a tort action to recover the entire loss.
Florida is by no means the only state that has adopted a system of no-fault automobile insurance. The following are no-fault automobile insurance statutes in effect
in other states: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-319 to -351(a) (Supp. 1973) (effective
Jan. 1, 1973); MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 90, §§ 34A, 34D, 34M, 34N, 340 (Supp. 1973)
(effective Jan. 1, 1971); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101-79 (Supp. 1973) (effective
Oct. 1, 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6A-1 to -20 (1973) (effective Jan. 1, 1973); N.Y.
INS. LAw §§ 670-77 (McKinney Supp. 1973) (effective Feb. 1, 1974); UTAH COnE ANN.
§§ 31-41-1 to -13 (Supp. 1973) (effective Jan. 1, 1974); Hawaii Laws 1973, act 203
(effective May 31, 1973, full implementation July 1, 1974); Kan. Laws 1973, ch. 198
(effective Jan. 1, 1974); Nev. Laws 1973, ch. 530 (effective Feb. 1, 1974); ILL. STAT. ANN.
ch. 73, §§ 1065.150-.63 (Supp. 1973) (held unconstitutional, Grace v. Howlett, 283
N.E.2d 474 (Ill. 1972)). Two of these statutes have already been challanged on constitutional grounds. The Illinois Supreme Court in Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474
(Ill. 1972), held that state's no-fault provisions unconstitutional. The Illinois court
based its holding essentially on the following facts: (1) a special law was passed
when a general law could have been made applicable, in derogation of ILL. CONST. art. IV,
§ 13; (2) the general damages recoverable by an injured party were based upon his
reasonable expenses for medical services which resulted in an irrational discrimination
against those who received less expensive medical treatment in some portions of the
state; (3) the compulsory arbitration of claims under $3,000 violated the rights of citizens
to a jury trial in derogation of ILL. CONSr. art. I, § 13. There are few similarities between
Florida's no-fault law and Illinois' no-fault provisions. The Massachusetts no-fault
law survived attacks on its constitutionality in Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592
(Mass. 1971). See note 38 infra.
3. Brief for Appellant at 2, Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
4. See Kluger v. White, 37 Fla. Supp. 183 (Dade Co. Cir. Ct. 1972).
5. Brief for Appellee Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. at 3, Kluger v. White, 281
So. 2d I (Fla. 1973).
FLA. STAT.
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statutes section 627.7386 is a "constitutional exercise of legislative
power."
Kluger took exception to the order of the circuit court and appealed to the Florida Supreme Court.8 Kluger's main contention
was that, by depriving her of the right to sue a tortfeasor for compensatory property damage to her automobile, the Florida Legislature had
denied her "redress for any injury" in violation of article I, section 21,
of the Florida constitution.9 Several additional ,challenges to section
627.738 were presented. 10 The court, however, directed its attention
6. It will be helpful to examine briefly the legislative purpose and rationale for
the adoption of the statute. The purpose is set forth concisely in FLA. STAT. § 627.751
(1971), which provides:
The purpose of §§ 627.30-627.41 is to require medical, surgical, funeral and disability insurance benefits to be provided without regard to fault under motor
vehicle policies that provide bodily injury and property damage liability insurance, or other security, for motor vehicles registered in this state .. ..
The underlying rationale is clear from an article written by the major proponents
of the no-fault law. William Gillespie and Kenneth MacKay wrote that the Florida
no-fault system
is a departure from the historic common law tort system which has developed
over a period of several hundred years. It is a step which has become necessary
because of the sheer number of automobiles, deaths and accidents upon our
highways. It is expected to reduce the costs of administering automobile insurance rates and should provide fairer distribution of benefits to injured
parties, insure prompter payment of benefits, reduce the number of accident
victims who receive nothing from the tort system and make automobile insurance more readily available. The accident victim in smaller cases will be
dealing with his own issuer instead of one which is a stranger to him. He will be
treated more like the policy holder he is than as an adversary.
Gillespie & MacKay, Florida's No-Fault Insurance Law, 45 FLA. B.J. 400, 402 (1971).
7. 37 Fla. Supp. at 183.
8. The appeal was taken pursuant to FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2) (1968) which provides in part: "Appeals from trial courts may be taken directly to the supreme court, as
a matter of right, . . . from final judgments or decrees directly passing upon the validity
'of a state statute ...." This jurisdictional grant is now embodied in FLA. CONST. art. V, §
3(b)(l).
9. Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 4. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 21, provides: "The
courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay." The Florida Supreme Court has stated
that this section of the constitution "was designed to give life and vitality, to the
maxim that for every wrong there is a remedy." Holland v. Mayes, 19 So. 2d 709, 711
(Fla. 1944). The section assumes that for every injury caused to an individual there is
a remedy provided by either statutory law or common law. Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d
243 (Fla. 1944). However, the section does not itself create new causes of action. Kirkpatrick v. Parker, 187 So. 620 (Fla. 1939).
10. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 10-19. It was argued that the Florida
Legislature denied appellant justice without sale, in violation of FLA. CONsT. art. I, §
21, by giving the appellant an option to purchase insurance in lieu of a tort action
for negligently destroyed property. Kluger's counsel reasoned that the only manner
in which someone who sustained property damages valued under $550 could receive
redress would be to purchase "full" or "basic" property insurance as described in FLA.
STAT. § 627.738(2) (1971). This requirement, counsel argued, constitutes the purchase
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and confined its decision to appellant's argument based on article I,
section 21,11 and held that section 627.738 failed to comply with a
"reasonable interpretation" of that constitutional provision. 1 2 Thus,
the court significantly limited the effective scope of Florida's innovative
no-fault automobile insurance law.
Noting that this was a case of first impression, 3 the court broadly
phrased the issue involved as whether the legislature has the power
to repeal or abolish a common law right without providing alternative
protection. 14 The court adopted a definitive rule for determining the
extent to which the legislature might limit such a right without violating article I, section 21, of the Florida constitution:
[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular
injury has been provided by statutory law predating the adoption
of a remedy, which was prohibited by the Florida Supreme Court in Rainey v. Rainey,
38 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1948). Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 10-11. The Declaration of
Rights, § 4, of the 1885 Florida Constitution, which the Rainey court interpreted, contains essentially the same provisions as FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 21.
Counsel also contended that the legislature denied Kluger equal protection of the
law "by establishing different treatment for vehicle owners with property damage
insurance as compared to vehicle owners without such insurance and vehicle owners
suffering damage exceeding $550.00 as compared with vehicle owners suffering damage
less than $550.00." Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 11.
Furthermore, counsel argued that Kluger was deprived of property without due
process of law and was denied the right to have a jury determine the amount of damages to her automobile. As to denial of due process, it was argued that Kluger was not
given an opportunity to be heard under FLA. STAT. § 627.738 (1971). As to denial of the
right to trial by jury, counsel relied upon FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22, in reasoning that trial
by jury in automobile accident cases was provided as of right prior to no-fault and
therefore cannot be taken away or denied. Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 15-19.
See Orr v. Avon Florida Citrus Corp., 177 So. 612 (Fla. 1937).
11. See 281 So. 2d at 3.
12. Id.
13. Id. In addition, the court opined that:
Retaining the right of action for damages over $550.00 (Fla. Stat. § 627.738(5),
F.S.A.) does not correct the constitutional infirmity, but merely gives rise to another argument, that appellant has been deprived of the equal protection of the
law solely on the basis of the value of her automobile in violation of Fla.Const.,
art. I, § 2, F.S.A., and U.S.Const., amend. XIV, § 1. It is unnecessary to reach
the merits of this contention because the statute under consideration has already
failed constitutional muster on other grounds.
281 So. 2d at 5. See Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971) (similar provision in
the Massachusetts no-fault law did not deny equal protection).
14. 281 So. 2d at 4. The court's initial reaction to the issue presented is reflected
in the following analysis:
Upon careful consideration of the requirements of society, and the ever-evolving
character of the law, we cannot adopt a complete prohibition against such legislative change. Nor can we adopt a view which would allow the Legislature to
destroy a traditional and long-standing cause of action upon mere leislative
whim, or when an alternative approach is available,
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of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of
Florida, or where such right has become a part of the common law
of the State pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature
is without power to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to
redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering
public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative
method of meeting such public necessity can be shown. 15
After setting forth the foregoing rule, the court responded to
appellees' allegations that it had "previously approved action by the
Legislature which violated [this] rule."'10 These allegations were based
on the supreme court's approval of the "guest statute," the Workmen's
Compensation Law and the abolition of the actions for alienation of
affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract
17
to marry.
The Kluger court answered by distinguishing these prior legislative initiatives from the enactment of the Florida No-Fault Automobile
Insurance Law. The court characterized its prior affirmation of the
constitutionality of the "guest statute"' s as the approval of a modification of a pre-existing right. The court stated that the right to sue
had not been abolished; rather, the degree of negligence required to
bring suit had been altered. 19 With respect to its approval of the
Workmen's Compensation Law,20 the court conceded that a tort
right had been eliminated, but emphasized that an adequate alternative
remedy was provided. The court described the Florida workmen's
15. Id. (emphasis added). See also 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 710 (1956).
16. 281 So. 2d at 4; see Brief for Appellee White at 24, Brief for Appellee Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. at 10, Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
17. See Brief for Appellee Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. at 10-14, Brief for Appellee
White at 24-26.
18. Fla. Laws 1937, ch. 18033, § 15 (repealed 1971). The "guest statute" provided
that no guest or nonpaying passenger could recover damages from the driver of the car
in which they were riding unless the driver had been grossly negligent in causing the
accident.
19. See McMillan v. Nelson, 5 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1942) (upholding the constitutionality of the "guest statute").
The degree of negligence required for a guest to sustain a cause of action against
the driver was changed from "ordinary" negligence to "gross" negligence. The rationale
behind this change was that nonpaying passengers are
quite often mere acquaintances and, as often, probably unknown persons now
commonly called 'hitch-hikers' who deliberately solicit free rides and to whom the
owner or driver of the automobile should be under no obligation except that not
to do those things which he knows, or should know, may reasonably be expected
to result in injury to the guest.
Id. at 870.
20. FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1971).
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compensation system as providing "adequate, sufficient, and even preferable safeguards for an employee who is injured on the job."' 21 The
assertion that the court had previously approved complete abolition
of the rights of action for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to marry22 was similarly unpersuasive to the majority. Quoting from its opinion in Rotwein v.
Gersten,23 the court responded that the legislature had acted out of
24
public necessity when it abolished those particular causes of action.
In sum, it was the court's opinion that a common law right can certainly be modified, but it cannot be abolished altogether, unless
remedy is provided or an "overpowereither an adequate alternative
25
exists.
ing public necessity"
21. 281 So. 2d at 4. The Florida Supreme Court has described the Workmen's
Compensation Law in the following language:
In return for accepting vicarious liability for all work-related injuries regardless
of fault, and surrendering his traditional defenses and superior resources for
litigation, the employer is allowed to treat compensation as a routine cost of
doing business which can be budgeted for without fear of any substantial adverse
tort judgments. Similarly, the employee trades his tort remedies for a system of
compensation without contest, thus sparing him the cost, delay and uncertainty
of a claim in litigation.
Mullarky v. Florida Feed Mills, Inc., 268 So. 2d 363, 366 (Fla. 1972). A workmen's compensation act similar to that of Florida was approved by the United States Supreme Court
in New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). The Supreme Court's extensive
reasoning in the White case is totally supportive of the conclusions reached by the
Florida Supreme Court in Mullarky upholding the Florida Workmen's Compensation
Law.
22. FLA. STAT. ch. 771 (1971). The court upheld the enactment of this statute in
Rotwein v. Gersten, 36 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1948).
The rights of action for alienation of affections and criminal conversation existed
for the protection of the marriage relationship from third parties. Alienation of affections is the "robbing" of husband or wife of the conjugal affection, fellowship and
comfort that exists in the normal marriage, whereas criminal conversation is aimed at
protection of the "marriage bed." Seduction is the act of enticing a woman to
intercourse through persuasion, solicitation or other means
have unlawful
without employment of force; this action could be brought at common law by anyone
entitled to the services of the woman. An action based on breach of the marriage
promise is governed by the common principles of contract law and is actionable by
either the man or the woman.
. 23. 36 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1948). The Rotwein court stated that "when [transactions]
become an instrument of extortion and blackmail, the legislature has the power to,
and may, limit or abolish them." Id. at 421. At the time of enactment of the legislation
abolishing the rights of redress in question, husbands and wives were profiting from
the threat of suit. A wife or husband would encourage development of a relationship
with a "victim" and the "injured" marriage partner would then demand payment
from the victim in return for a promise not to sue for alienation of affections, criminal
conversation, etc.
24. Because an overpowering public necessity for the abolition of such rights was
shown, the legislature did not need to provide any alternative remedy. See note 15 and
accompanying text supra.
25. 281 So. 2d at 4.
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Guided by this rule, the Kluger court proceeded to consider
whether an adequate alternative was provided for, or overwhelming
public necessity justified the complete abolition of, the right to sue
for property damage of less than $550. No "overpowering public
necessity for the [complete] abolishment of such right ' 2 6 was shown,
although, by attempting to provide an alternative remedy to the
abolished tort right, the legislature demonstrated that it did not intend
to eliminate completely all rights to redress. However, the court apparently concluded that the alternative provided by the legislaturethe "option" to purchase collision insurance-was not a sufficient substitute for the right to sue in tort.2 7 This conclusion is well-founded:
an automobile owner with minimal education might easily misunderstand the waiver he must sign if he elects not to purchase "basic property protection. ' '2 8 Moreover, there is no assurance that an insurance
salesman will explain intelligibly the potential consequences of a
driver's failure to purchase property protection.2 9 As the court itself
noted, the very facts in Kluger demonstrate that no sufficient alternative to the tort remedy was provided, since a nonnegligent party was
left without any available means of obtaining redress for damage
she had sustained. 0
Dissenting from the majority opinion, Justice Boyd, joined by
Chief Justice Carlton and Justice Dekle, concluded that the abolition
of the right to sue for property damage under $550 did constitute a
legitimate exercise of legislative power. Like the majority, Justice
Boyd referred to various instances in which the court had permitted
the abolition or modification of previously existing rights of redress. 81
However, Justice Boyd seemed to rely upon those decisions simply as
26. Id.
27. The court did suggest that mandatory collision insurance would be sufficient.
See note 51 and accompanying text infra.
28. The prescribed waiver form provides:
"The named insured acknowledges and agrees that (1) the Company has offered
to provide basic property protection coverage or collision insurance; and (2) the
named insured hereby rejects this offered coverage; and in effecting this rejection, the named insured acknowledges and understands that the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act may preclude recovery from others for accidental
property damage to the automobile."
281 So. 2d at 5 n.l.
29. Kluger argued that her dilemma resulted from this problem. See 281 So. 2d at 2.
30. The argument that Kluger's situation was the result of her own free choice,
and that the state should not require an individual to act for his own benefit is, of
course, the same argument once raised by those who opposed social security. That argument has found little judicial solicitude. See note 49 infra.
31. Mr. Justice Boyd briefly reviewed the decisions of the court approving the
Workmen's Compensation Law, the "guest statute" and the abolition of the actions
for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to
marry. 281 So. 2d at 6-9.
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precedent for his general conclusion that the right to bring suit "is
3
subject to reasonable restraints.."

2

Unlike the majority,3 3 the dissent

did not distinguish those prior decisions from the abolition of the
right to sue for property damage-nor did the dissent attempt to refute
the majority's conclusion that those prior3 4instances of abolition or
modification were, in fact, distinguishable.
Justice Boyd warned that a "literal and dogmatic ,construction"
of article I, section 21, of the Florida constitution would prohibit
the legislature and the courts from imposing "logical limitations on
3' 5
the constitutional right to use the courts of Florida." However, the
36
pragmatic rule of law set forth by the majority would seem to preclude any such "literal and dogmatic construction" of section 21,
and Justice Boyd did not suggest that the rule was erroneously stated
or that it was inappropriately applied to the abolition of the tort
right considered in Kluger. Indeed, Justice Boyd did not address himself to the majority rule at all.
The dissent relied substantially upon the reasoning of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Pinnick v. Cleary,3 7 where a statutory provision similar to Florida statutes section 627.738 was upheld against
constitutional attack. 8 Justice Boyd premised his dissent upon a questionable analogy between the two laws.3 9 Noting that the "arguments
32. 281 So. 2d at 6.
33. See notes 18-25 and accompanying text supra.
34. 281 So. 2d at 7.
35. Id. at 6.
36. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
37. 271 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971).
38. Id. In Pinnick, the Massachusetts Supreme Court was confronted with constitutional challenges to a provision of the Massachusetts no-fault insurance law similar
to the provision challenged in Kluger. The Massachusetts provision includes a $500
medical expense threshold that must be exceeded before an injured party can sue for
pain and suffering; the Florida law includes a $550 threshold that must be exceeded
before a party can bring suit for property damage. The challenges to the Massachusetts
law in Pinnick were similar to those raised by the appellant in Kluger. However, it was
necessary for the Pinnick court to consider all the challenges to the statute because
the provision in question passed constitutional muster on each succeeding challenge.
The challenge that a substantive common law right had been abolished by the personal injury section of the Massachusetts statute was rejected by the Pinnick court. The
court reasoned that the article in question is "clearly directed toward the preservation
of procedural rights and has been so construed." See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hanley,
149 N.E.2d 608 (Mass. 1958); Cressey v. Erie R.R., 180 N.E. 160 (Mass. 1932). The
court further reasoned that "changes in prior law are necessary in any ordered society,
and to argue that art. 11 prohibits alterations of common law rights as such
flies in the face of all reason and precedent." 271 N.E.2d at 600.
39. Justice Boyd premised his dissent upon a supposed analogy between the Florida
law, which allows suit by one who declines to purchase pr6perty insurance only when
his property damages exceed $550, and the Massachusetts law, which provides that
one who elects a deductible-and thus, effectively, declines to purchase otherwise com-

186
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raised against the Massachusetts law mirror those made against the
Florida law," 40 Justice Boyd quoted verbatim the response of the
Massachusetts court to those arguments, apparently believing the
language of the Massachusetts court sufficient to refute Kluger's allegations.
The dissent also quoted the Pinnick court's discussion of the United
States Supreme Court decision in New York Cent. R.R. v. White.4 1 In
White the Supreme Court upheld the New York Workmen's Compensation Act,42 reasoning that, although the employee had lost his com-

mon law right to sue, he had gained the assurance of some compensation, without delay, for any accident suffered.4 3 The Pinnick court
noted that the Massachusetts no-fault law altered prior legal rights "to
a much less drastic extent" than did the New York Workmen's Compensation Act. 44 Justice Boyd quoted this language from Pinnick,4 5
evidently concluding that, if the Massachusetts law altered prior
rights less drastically than did workmen's compensation, the Florida
law must similarly alter rights less drastically than did the statute approved in White. However, immediately following that portion of
Pinnick quoted by Justice Boyd, the Massachusetts court went on to
consider the "exchange of rights" implicit in the Massachusetts law,
and concluded that a fair "trade-off" had resulted." Justice Boyd did
pulsory insurance-may sue for pain and suffering only when his medical expenses exceed $500. But the analogy seems to fail upon closer examination. There is a significant
difference between the "right" to bring suit for property damage and the "right" to
sue for "pain and suffering." The speculative nature of "pain and suffering" precludes
any realistic valuation of damages, as the Pinnick court seemed to recognize. See 271 N.E.2d
at 597. Moreover, the Massachusetts law does allow suit, regardless of medical expense
involved, where certain serious injuries that are more likely to result in actual pain and
suffering occur. And finally, as the Pinnick court noted, the Massachusetts law does
allow "double recovery" for those who maintain personal medical insurance, as well
as no-fault medical insurance. Id. at 599. Thus, the excess compensation resulting from
holding two policies can in part offset what might have been awarded in damages
for pain and suffering. Id. In short, loss of the right to sue for pain and suffering in
Massachusetts is not really so total as loss of the right to sue for property damage
in Florida. Therefore, the fact that the Massachusetts court upheld the abolition of
the former does not necessarily suggest, as Justice Boyd assumed, that the reasoning
of the Massachusetts court supports abolition of the latter.
40. 281 So. 2d at 8.
41. 243 U.S. 188 (1916).
42. N.Y. WORKMAN'S COMP. LAW §§ 1-401 (McKinney 1965).
43. See 243 U.S. at 204.
44. 271 N.E.2d at 606.
45. 281 So. 2d at 9.
46. 271 N.E.2d at 606. The effects of the Massachusetts No-Fault Automobile Insurance Law were: (1) to make available to motorists compulsory insurance at lower
rates; (2) to assure the injured motorist of quick and efficient payment of the first
$2,000 of defined losses incurred; (3) to enable a nonnegligent motorist to avoid the
uncertainty, delay and cost of a tort proceeding; and (4) to permit an injured party
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not carry his analysis that far, and did not suggest why the trade-off
implicit in Florida statutes section 627.738 was similarly sufficient.
The dissent did advert to perhaps the most compelling rationale
for upholding Florida's no-fault law: the assurance of quick settlement and recovery of at least reasonable damages whenever an accident occurs.4 7 But his dissent failed to deal realistically with the problem that troubled the majority-the fact than an individual such as
Kluger might be left with neither property protection nor a right to
sue as long as the coverage in section 627.738(l)-(2) was optional. Rather, Justice Boyd reasoned that, since the legislature could require
the purchase of collision insurance, it obviously could permit an automobile owner, at his discretion, "either to acquire said insurance, or
to be his own insurer.' ' 48 This questionable logic ignores the fact that
Florida statutes section 627.738 not only "permitted" an individual
to be his own insurer, but also abolished his right to sue in tort. Thus,
the dissent failed to offer any means of protecting a driver who may
not understand the consequences of waiving basic property protection,
or who may be misled-even unintentionally-by an insurance salesman.
The Kluger decision may only temporarily restrict the scope of
Florida's no-fault law. The supreme court alluded to a corrective
measure which might cure the law's constitutional infirmity:
Had the Legislature chosen to require that appellant be insured
against property damage loss- as is, in effect, required by Fla. Stat.
§ 627.733, F.S.A., with respect to other possible damages-the issues
would be different. A reasonable alternative to an action in tort
would have been provided and the issue would have been whether
or not the requirement of insurance for all motorists was reasonable. 49
Therefore, the short term effect of Kluger may be to increase automobile accident litigation, but, as intimated by the court, the prowho has exceeded the threshold in medical expenses to retain the option of recovering
additional sums by litigation.
47. 281 So. 2d at 10.
48. Id.
49. 281 So. 2d at 5 (emphasis added). The Massachusetts court in Pinnick addressed
the constitutionality of mandatory insurance: "Any doubts as to the power of the
Legislature to require the citizen, for the good of the public as a whole, to take
measures for his own benefit have long since been settled in a series of cases sustaining
such statutes." 271 N.E.2d at 607. See also Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301
U.S. 495, 505-6 (1937) (Alabama Unemployment Compensation Act, requiring contributions from employees as well as employers); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 634-35
(1937) (Social Security Act establishing "Federal Old Age Benefits," requiring contributions
from employees through a special income tax deducted from their wages).
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perty protection section of the no-fault law might ultimately be revived by the legislature. The question remains whether the legislature
will follow the suggestion of the court, or will be content to leave
50
property protection outside the no-fault statute.

Criminal Law-WIRETAPPING-CONSENTING

PARTY TO CONVERSATION

RECORDED

REQUIRED

BY POLICE WITHOUT WARRANT

To VERIFY AT

TRIAL CONSENT TO RECORDING PRIOR TO ITS ADMISSION AGAINST OTHER

PARTY TO CONVERSATION.-Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1973).
While jailed for possession of marijuana, Ted Tollett became
friendly with a cellmate, Jesse Davis. Captain Campbell of the Leon
County Sheriff's Department asked Davis " 'to help me with Mr. Tollett

on making a buy.'

",

Although he initially refused, Davis ultimately

agreed to cooperate. After Tollett was released, Davis, under Campbell's direction, telephoned him four times. Three of the calls
originated from Campbell's office, where they were recorded; Davis
placed the fourth call from the county jail while Campbell listened
on an extension. Acting upon telephoned instructions, Tollett came
to the jail allegedly to sell drugs to Davis. Later Tollett went to a
motel room to discuss the possible sale of his unborn child with a

potential buyer, who in reality was an undercover agent. The conversation between Tollett and the agent also was recorded. Tollett
and his wife were then charged both with attempting to sell an unborn
child and with dispensing contraband at the Leon County Jail. At
trial the state played the recorded conversations to the jury over defense objections. Davis never appeared in court, nor was his absence
explained. Tollett was convicted of dispensing contraband and LSD to

a prisoner; he and his wife were convicted of attempting to sell the
unborn child.
Holding that the trial court properly allowed the recordings to be

played before the jury, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the
50. Allowance of tort claims when the value of property damage does not exceed
$550 will probably not substantially increase automobile accident litigation. The expense involved in pursuing a claim of less than $550 would almost neutralize the
potential recovery. Partly for this reason, the Chairman of the House Insurance Committee will probably recommend that the property protection section of no-fault
not be re-enacted. Chairman Birchfield believes that property protection is not an
essential part of an effective no-fault system. Interview with Representative William
Birchfield, Chairman of the House Insurance Committee, in Tallahassee, Florida, October
31, 1973.
1. 272 So. 2d at 491.

